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Abstract— This paper considers the security of transmission in
buffer-aided decode-and-forward cooperative wireless networks.
An eavesdropper which can intercept the data transmission from
both the source and relay nodes is considered to threaten the
security of transmission. Finite size data buffers are assumed to
be available at every relay in order to avoid having to select
concurrently the best source-to-relay and relay-to-destination
links. A new max-ratio relay selection policy is proposed to
optimize the secrecy transmission by considering all the possible
source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links and selecting the
relay having the link which maximizes the signal to eavesdropper
channel gain ratio. Two cases are considered in terms of knowl-
edge of the eavesdropper channel strengths: exact and average
gains, respectively. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage
probability for both cases are obtained, which are verified by
simulations. The proposed max-ratio relay selection scheme is
shown to outperform one based on a max-min-ratio relay scheme.
Index Terms— Secure wireless communications, cooperative
networks, relay selection, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
TRADITIONALLY security in wireless networks has beenfocused on higher layers using cryptographic meth-
ods [1]. However, retaining security at high layers is becoming
more challenging due to the increased potential for attack,
therefore, there has been growing interest in implementing
security at the physical layer. Related work was described as
early as in the 1970s [2]–[5], and more recently for physi-
cal layer security in wireless communications [6]–[10]. The
purpose of physical layer security is to prevent eavesdroppers
from intercepting the data transmitted between the source and
intended destination. The secrecy is quantified by the secrecy
capacity, or the maximum rate of reliable information sent
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from the source to the intended destination in the presence of
eavesdroppers [5].
Recent research shows that cooperative communication
not only significantly improves the transmission capacity for
wireless networks (e.g. [11] and [12]), but also provides an
effective way to improve the secrecy capacity. This is achieved
by carefully designing the relays to maximize the information
rate at the intended destination and minimize that at the
eavesdroppers [13]. In general, there are three ways to improve
the secrecy capacity in a cooperative network:
• Distributed beamforming - The secrecy capacity can be
maximized by optimizing the transmission weights (or
the beamforming weights) at the relay and source nodes
(e.g. [14] and [15]). Such distributed beamforming how-
ever requires high coordination (such as synchronization
and central optimization) among source and relay nodes,
which usually requires high overhead in implementation,
i.e. a large amount of information needs to be exchanged
between the relay nodes.
• Jamming - A jammer is used to inject artificial inter-
ference into the system. When the injected interfer-
ing power is higher at the eavesdroppers than that at
the intended destination, the secrecy capacity can be
improved (e.g. [16]–[18]). This often requires the jammer
to be located closer to the eavesdroppers than to the
destination node, which is not always possible in practice.
• Relay selection - Relay selection can increase the secrecy
capacity by choosing an appropriate relay node with
“strong” transmission link to the intended destination
node and “weak” link to the eavesdropper [19]–[22]. The
relay selection provides an attractive way to improve the
secrecy capacity with little overhead in implementation.
The performance of the relay selection depends strongly
on the number of available links for selection, which
again depends on not only the number of relays but
also the relay selection scheme. When the number of
available links is limited, so is the secrecy performance.
Thus it is important to investigate relay selection schemes
to have the best secrecy performance for a given number
of relays, which is the main objective of this paper.
In traditional relay selection to improve wireless commu-
nications, the best relay is selected with the strongest link
connecting the source and destination (e.g. [23] and [24]).
It is shown in [19] that by using relay selection the secrecy
capacity can also be improved when the best relay is selected
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to maximize the signal to eavesdropper channel gain ratio,
which is abbreviated as the “gain ratio” in this paper. The
relay selection scheme in [19] is based on the scenario that
the eavesdropper can only intercept the signals from the relays
but not the source node. On the other hand, if the eavesdropper
intercepts signals from both the relay and source nodes, the
best relay is selected as having the maximum secrecy capacity
among every pair of source-to-relay and relay-to-destination
links [18], which is termed as the max-min-ratio scheme in
this paper. Alternatively, it is also possible to select a jammer
from the available relays (e.g [20]), but this is at the price
of injecting more inference not only to the intended receivers
but also to other users in the system. As was shown in [20],
including a jammer does not necessarily lead to improvement
in secrecy capacity, and thus a switching scheme was described
to activate/deactivate the jammer.
Recent research shows that, by introducing data buffers
at the relays, it is possible to relax the constraint that the
best source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links for a packet
transmission must be determined concurrently, and achieve
significant performance advantage [25]–[30]. A typical buffer-
aided relay selection is the max-max scheme described in [27],
where the strongest source-to-relay and relay-to-destination
links are selected alternatively so that it has significant coding
gain over the traditional max-min scheme. Because the max-
max relay selection still follows the traditional transmission
order, that is the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination trans-
missions always carry on in an alternative manner, it can only
attain a diversity order of N which is the same as that for the
max-min scheme, where N is the number of available relay
nodes. In the recent max-link approach [25], this constraint on
the transmission order is further relaxed so that, at any time,
a best link is selected among all available source-to-relay and
relay-to-destination links. Depending on whether a source-to-
relay or a relay-to-destination link is selected, either the source
transmits a packet to the selected relay or the selected relay
forwards a stored packet to the destination. It is shown in [25]
that the max-link relay selection not only has coding gain over
the max-min scheme, but also has higher diversity order than
both the max-min and max-max schemes. In particular, the
diversity order can approach 2N when the relay buffer size is
large enough.
Inspired by the max-link scheme, in this paper, we propose a
novel max-ratio relay selection scheme for secure transmission
in decode-and-forward (DF) relay networks with an eaves-
dropper which can intercept signals from both the source and
relay nodes. In the proposed max-ratio scheme, every relay
is equipped with a data buffer, and the best link is always
selected with the highest gain ratio among all available source-
to-relay and relay-to-destination links. We consider two cases
for which either the exact, or the average gain, for the eaves-
dropping channel is available; the latter case is of particular
interest in practice since it is not always possible to obtain
the exact channel information describing the eavesdropping
channels. Both theoretical and simulation results show that
the proposed max-ratio relay selection has significantly better
performance than the conventional max-min-ratio scheme,
confirming that it represents an attractive approach for secure
wireless transmission. The main contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows to:
• Propose the buffer-aided max-ratio relay selection policy
for secure communications in a DF cooperative network.
This is the first approach in using buffer-aided relay
selection in secure transmission under the scenario that
the eavesdropper can intercept signals from both the
source and relay nodes. Existing relay selection schemes
for secure transmission mainly assume no source-to-
eavesdropper link for simplicity (e.g. [19]). While in [22]
both the source and relay to eavesdropper links are
considered, the proposed scheme is for the two-way relay
network and furthermore no closed form expression is
obtained for the secrecy outage probability.
• Derive closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage
probability of the max-ratio scheme for both cases when
either the exact, or average, gains of the eavesdrop-
ping channels are available. Because the gain-ratios for
the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination transmissions
have different statistical distributions, the secrecy outage
performance of the proposed max-ratio scheme is much
more involved to analyze than existing approaches such
as the relay selection scheme for secure transmission
in [19] and the buffer-aided max-link scheme for wireless
communications in [25]. In this paper, the problem arising
from such “unbalanced” distribution has been success-
fully solved, and the analysis also provides a useful
way in analyzing similar systems such as a typical relay
selection scheme but without the usual assumption that
the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination channels are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II describes the system model; Section III proposes
the max-ratio relay selection scheme; Sections IV and V
analyze the secrecy outage probability for the cases with
exact and average knowledge of the eavesdropping channels,
respectively; Section VI discusses the performance of the
max-ratio scheme when the relay buffer sizes go to infinity;
Section VII gives numerical simulations to verify the proposed
max-ratio scheme; finally, Section VIII summarizes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of the relay network with an eavesdrop-
per is shown in Fig. 1, where there is one source node (S),
one destination node (D), a set of K relays {R1, R2, . . . , RK },
and one eavesdropper (E) which can intercept signals from
both the source and relay nodes. The relay nodes apply the
DF protocol and perform the half-duplex mode so that they
do not transmit and receive simultaneously.
In our model, we assume no direct link between the source
and the destination due to path loss or shadowing effects.1
The channel coefficients for S → Rk , S → E , Rk → D
and Rk → E at time t are denoted as hsrk (t), hse(t), hrk d(t)
and hrk e(t) respectively, where similar subscripts are also
used for other parameters to indicate different channels in
1Including the direct link has little effect on the relay selection which is the
main issue in this paper.
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Fig. 1. Relay selection system model in secure transmission, where the
eavesdropper intercepts signals from both the source and relay nodes.
this paper. We assume the channels are quasi-static Rayleigh
fading so that the channel coefficients remain unchanged
during one packet duration but independently vary from one
packet time to another. We also assume that all source-to-
relay links are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
fading and that E|hsrk (t)|2 = γsr for all k; all relay-to-
destination channel gains are also i.i.d. and E|hrkd (t)|2 =
γrd , as are all relay-to-eavesdropper channel gains for which
E|hrk e(t)|2 = γre. The source-to-eavesdropper channel gain
is denoted as E|hse(t)|2 = γse. It is noted that we do not
require any two of γsr , γrd , γse and γre to be the same,
thereby representing a “practical” scenario. All noises are
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), and without losing
generality the noise variances are all normalized to unity.
The transmission powers for source and relay nodes are all
assumed to be Es .
With the DF applied at the relays, if the relay Rk is selected
for the data transmission, the instantaneous secrecy capacity
for the overall system is obtained as [31]
Ck(t)=max
{
1
2
log2
min{1+Es|hsrk (t)|2, 1+Es|hrk d (t)|2}
1+Es|hse(t)|2+Es |hrk e(t)|2
}
(1)
If the exact knowledge of the eavesdropping channels are
available, the best relay node can be selected with the maxi-
mum Ck(t). On the other hand, if only the average gains of the
eavesdropping channels are known, the best relay maximizes
Ck(t) with |hse(t)|2 and |hrke(t)|2 being replaced with the
average gains γse and γre in (1) respectively. This scheme is
termed as the max-min-ratio relay selection in this paper.
For convenience in development, the time index t is ignored
in the rest of the paper unless necessary.
III. MAX-RATIO RELAY SELECTION
The performance of the max-min-ratio scheme is limited
by the constraint that the best source-to-relay and relay-to-
destination links must be determined concurrently. In this
paper, we propose a new max-ratio selection scheme by mak-
ing use of data buffers at the relays. To be specific, we assume
that every relay is equipped with a data buffer Qk (1 ≤ k ≤ K )
of finite size L (in the number of data packets), and the
data packets in the buffer follow the “first-in-first-out”rule.
At any time, the best transmission link with the highest
gain-ratio is selected among all available source-to-relay and
relay-to-destination links. Depending on the knowledge of the
eavesdropper channel, we have two selection criteria:
Case 1 - If the exact knowledge of all channels,2 including
the eavesdropping channels hse and hrk e, are available, the
max-ratio selects the best relay as
R(max−rat io)case 1
= arg max
Rk
⎧⎨
⎩
max
Rk :(Qk) =L
{|hsrk |2}
|hse|2 , maxRk :(Qk ) =0
{ |hrk d |2
|hrk e|2
}⎫⎬
⎭,
(2)
where (Qk) gives the number of data packets in
buffer Qk .
Case 2 - If only the average channel gains for the eaves-
dropping channels, i.e. γse and γre, are available (but the exact
knowledge for all other channels is known), the best relay for
the max-ratio scheme is selected as:
R(max−rat io)case 2
= arg max
Rk
⎧⎨
⎩
max
Rk :(Qk ) =L
{|hsrk |2}
γse
,
max
Rk :(Qk) =0
{|hrkd |2}
γre
⎫⎬
⎭. (3)
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probability is defined as Pout = P(C <
rsc), where C is the instantaneous secrecy capacity, rsc is
the target secrecy capacity and P(.) gives the probability of
the enclosed. In the max-ratio relay selection scheme, at any
time, the numbers of data packets in every buffer form a
“state”. Because there are K available relays and every relay
is equipped with a buffer of size L, there are (L + 1)K states
in total. The l-th state vector is defined as
sl = [l(Q1), . . . , l(QK )]T, l = 1, . . . , (L + 1)K , (4)
where l(Qk) gives the number of data packets in buffer Qk
at state sl . It is clear that 0 ≤ l(Qk) ≤ L. Every state
corresponds to one pair of (K1, K2), where K1 and K2 are
the numbers of available links for source-to-relay and relay-
to-destination transmission, respectively. A source-to-relay or
a relay-to-destination link is considered available when the
buffer of the corresponding relay node is not full or not empty
respectively. It is clear that 0 ≤ K1 ≤ K and 0 ≤ K2 ≤ K .
Specifically, if none of the buffers is full or empty, all links
are available such that K1 = K2 = K .
At state sl , the best link is selected among all K1 source-to-
relay and K2 relay-to-destination links. We denote pslout as the
outage probability for state sl . Considering all possible states,
we obtain the secrecy outage probability for the max-ratio
relay selection as
Pout =
(L+1)K∑
l=1
πl · pslout , (5)
2The CSI is usually estimated through pilots and feedback (e.g. [32]), and
the CSI estimation without feedback may also be applied (e.g [33]). Further
detail of the CSI estimation is beyond the scope of this paper.
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where πl = p(sl) which is the stationary probability for
state sl .
B. State Transition Matrix
Suppose at time t , the state for the relay buffers is sl .
At time (t +1), there is one relay selected for either receiving
or transmitting a data packet, so that the number of packets
in the corresponding buffer is increased or decreased by one
respectively. Depending on which relay receives or transmits
data, at time (t + 1), the buffers may move from state sl to
several possible states, forming a Markov chain. We denote
A as the (L + 1)K × (L + 1)K state transition matrix, where
the entry An,l = P(Xt+1 = sn |Xt = sl) is the transition
probability that the state moves from sl at time t to sn at
time (t + 1).
If the secrecy outage event occurs, the state sl remain
unchanged at time (t + 1). Otherwise, sl moves to another
state. Thus the probability for sl to leave for another state is
given by
pleavesl = 1 − pslout . (6)
It is clear from the selection rules (2) and (3) that, for both
Cases 1 and 2, the probabilities to select the source-to-relay
and relay-to-destination transmission at any time are not the
same. This is very different from the max-link approach in [25]
where the selection of any available link is equally likely. We
divide all states which can be moved from sl into two sets,
U+l and U
−
l , where U
+
l contains all states to which sl can
move when a source-to-relay link is selected and U−l contains
all states to which sl can move when a relay-to-destination
link is selected. We let pS→Dsl and p
R→D
sl be the probabilities
that the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination transmissions
are selected at state sl , respectively. It is clear that pS→Dsl +
pR→Dsl = 1.
On the other hand, because we assume all source-to-relay
channels are i.i.d. fading and all relay-to-destination channels
are also i.i.d. frequency flat fading and so are the relay-to-
eavesdropper channels, the selection of one particular link
within either U+l or U
−
l is equally likely. Therefore, the
probability to select a source-to-relay or relay-to-destination
link at state sl is given by
p+sl = pleavesl
(
1
K1
pS→Rsl
)
= 1
K1
(1 − pslout)(1 − pR→Dsl ),
p−sl = pleavesl
(
1
K2
pR→Dsl
)
= 1
K2
(1 − pslout)pR→Dsl , (7)
respectively.
With these observations, the (n, l)-th entry of the state
transition matrix A is expressed as
An,l =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
psl = pslout, if n = l,
p+sl = 1K1 (1 − p
sl
out)(1 − pR→Dsl ), if sn ∈ U+l ,
p−sl = 1K2 (1 − p
sl
out)pR→Dsl , if sn ∈ U−l ,
0, elsewhere.
(8)
Because the transition matrix A in (8) is column stochastic,
irreducible and aperiodic,3 the stationary state probability
vector is obtained as (see [35] and [36])
π = (A − I + B)−1b, (9)
where π = [π1, · · · , π(L+1)K ]T, b = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T , I is the
identity matrix and Bn,l is an n × l all one matrix.
Finally, substituting (8) and (9) into (5) re-formats the
secrecy outage probability as
Pout =
(L+1)K∑
l=1
πl · pslout = diag(A) · π
= diag(A) · (A − I + B)−1b, (10)
where diag(A) is a vector consisting of all diagonal elements
of A.
It is clear from (10) that the secrecy outage probability Pout
is determined by A which again, from (8), is determined by
pslout and pR→Dsl . The secrecy outage probabilities for both
Cases 1 and 2 can be expressed as (10), but with different
pslout and pR→Dsl which are derived below.
IV. CASE 1 - EXACT KNOWLEDGE OF
EAVESDROPPING CHANNELS
In Case 1, we assume exact knowledge for the instantaneous
gains for all channels, including the eavesdropping channels.
This is a typical assumption in many existing approaches
(e.g. [20] and [21]).
A. pslout : Outage Probability at State sl for Case 1
The relay selection rule for Case 1 is shown in (2). For
better exposition, we let x = max
(Qk) =L
{|hsrk |2}/|hse|2, y =
max
(Qk) =0
{|hrk d |2/|hrk e|2} and z = max(x, y). In order to con-
centrate on the secrecy capacity, we assume the channel SNR
is high enough so that the decoding is always successfully at
the relay and destination nodes.4 The probability of outage
event at state sl at the high SNR is given by
pslout = P(z < 22rsc ) = FZ (z)|z=22rsc , (11)
where FZ (z) is the cumulative-probability-function (CDF) of
z which is derived below.
Recall that state sl corresponds to (K1, K2). From the theory
of order statistics [37], if the number of available source-to-
relay links is K1, the CDF of x1 = max
(Qk) =L
{|hsrk |2} is given
by
FX1(x) = [1 − e−
x
γsr ]K1, (12)
Noting that x = x1/|hse|2, the CDF of x is then obtained as
FX (x) =
K1∑
i=0
CiK1(−1)i
M1
i x + M1 , (13)
3Column stochastic means all entries in any column sum up to one,
irreducible means that it is possible to move from any state to any state,
and aperiodic means that it is possible to return to the same state at any
steps [34], [35].
4This is a typical assumption in most existing secure communications
literature (e.g. [19], [20]).
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where CiK1 = K1!/[i !(K1 − i)!] which is the binomial
coefficient, and M1 = γsr/γse which is the average gain
ratio between the source-to-relay and source-to-eavesdropper
channels.
On the other hand, because the number of available relay-
to-destination links is K2, the CDF of y is given by
FY (y) =
[
y
M2 + y
]K2
, (14)
where M2 = γrd/γre which is the average gain ratio between
the relay-to-destination and relay-to-eavesdropper channels.
Because x and y are mutually independent, from (13) and
(14), the CDF of z = max(x, y) is obtained as:
FZ (z) = FX (z)FY (z) =
K1∑
i=0
CiK1(−1)i
M1
i z+M1
[
z
M2+z
]K2
.
(15)
Substituting (15) into (11) gives
pslout =
K1∑
i=0
CiK1(−1)i
M1
i22rsc + M1
[
22rsc
M2 + 22rsc
]K2
. (16)
The next subsection will provide the probability of selecting
the relay to destination transmission at state sl .
B. pR→Dsl : Probability of Selecting the Relay-to-Destination
Transmission at State sl for Case 1
If there are no relay-to-destination links available (or K2 =
0), we have pR→Dsl = 0. On the other hand, if there are
no source-to-relay links available (or K1 = 0), we have
pR→Dsl = 1. For other cases, pR→Dsl is obtained in Appendix I.
In summary, we have obtained pR→Dsl (17), as shown at the
bottom of the page, where B(x, y) = ∫ 10 t x−1(1 − t)y−1dt
which is the Beta function and F2,1(a, b, c, z) is the first
hypergeometric function. Finally, substituting (16) and (17)
into (10) gives the secrecy outage probability at the high SNR
for Case 1.
V. CASE 2 - KNOWLEDGE OF THE AVERAGE CHANNEL
GAINS FOR EAVESDROPPING CHANNELS
In case 2, we only have knowledge of the average gains
for eavesdropping channels, while the exact information for
all other channels are still available.
A. pslout : Outage Probability at State sl for Case 2
We let uab = |hab|2/γab be the normalized gain for
channel hab, where {ab} ∈ {srk, se, rkd, rke}. Because of
the normalization, all uab have the same probability-density-
distribution (PDF) as
fU (u) = e−u, (18)
The selection rule in (3) can then be expressed as
R(2)b
= arg max
Rk
{
max
Rk :(Qk ) =L
{
M1 · usrk
}
, max
Rk :(Qk ) =0
{
M2 · urkd
}}
,
(19)
where M1 and M2 are defined in (13) and (14), respectively.
We further let f = max
Rk :(Qk ) =L
{
M1 · usrk
}
, g =
max
Rk :(Qk ) =0
{
M2 · urkd
}
and w = max{ f, g}. It is clear that w is
directly obtained from the selection rule (3) which is based on
the average gain of the eavesdropping channels. On the other
hand, the secrecy outage is determined by the instantaneous
gains of the data and eavesdropping channels. Therefore, in
order to obtain the outage probability, w needs to be divided
by u which is normalized exponentially distributed with PDF
given by (18). Or the outage probability for state sl for Case 2
is given by
pslout = P(v < 22rsc ) = FV (v)|v=22rsc , (20)
where v = w/u.
The CDF-s of f and g are given by
FF ( f ) =
[
1 − e− f/M1
]K1
and FG (g) =
[
1 − e−g/M2
]K2
,
(21)
respectively. Because f and g are mutually independent, the
CDF of w = max{ f, g} is obtained as
FW (w) = FF (w)FG (w) =
[
1−e−w/M1
]K1 [
1−e−w/M2
]K2
.
(22)
Then the CDF of v = w/u is
FV (v) =
∫ ∞
0
[
1 − e−uv/M1
]K1 [
1 − e−uv/M2
]K2
e−udu
=
K1∑
i=0
K2∑
j=0
CiK1C
i
K2(−1)i+ j
M1 M2
v(M2i + M1 j) + M1 M2 .
(23)
pR→Dsl =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, K2 = 0, 0 < K1 ≤ K ,
1−K1/2+∑K1i = 2 CiK1(−1)i i [ln(i)− 1] + 1(i − 1)2 , 0 < K1 ≤ K , K2 = 1, M1 = M2
1+∑K1i = 1 CiK1(−1)i M1 M2i ln(i)+i ln(M2)M2−i ln(M1)M2−M2i +M1(M1−i M2)2 , 0 < K1 ≤ K , K2 = 1, M1 = M2
1+∑K1i = 1 CiK1(−1)i K2( M1M2i )
K2B(2, K2)F2,1([K2+1, K2], K2+2, 1− M1M2i ), 0 < K1 ≤ K , 1 < K2 ≤ K ,
1, K1 = 0, 0 < K2 ≤ K ,
(17)
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Substituting (23) into (11) gives
pslout =
K1∑
i=0
K2∑
j=0
CiK1C
i
K2(−1)i+ j
M1 M2
22rsc (M2i + M1 j) + M1 M2 .
(24)
The next subsection will provide the probability of selecting
the relay to destination transmission at state sl .
B. pR→Dsl : Probability of Selecting the Relay-to-Destination
Transmission at State sl for Case 2
Similar to that in Case 1, we have pR→Dsl = 0 for K2 = 0,
and pR→Dsl = 1 for K1 = 0. But otherwise, we have
pR→Dsl = P( f < g) =
∫ ∫
f <g
fFG ( f, g)d f dg, (25)
where fFG( f, g) is the joint PDF of f and g.
From (21), the PDFs of f and g are obtained as
fF ( f ) = K1M1 e
− fM1 (1 − e−
f
M1 )K1−1
fG (g) = K2M2 e
− gM2 (1 − e−
g
M2 )K2−1, (26)
respectively. Because f and g are mutually independent, we
have fFG( f, g) = fF ( f ) fG(g).
Substituting (26) into (25) gives (27), as shown at the
bottom of the page. Therefore, we have pR→Dsl in (28), as
shown at the bottom of the page. Finally, substituting (24)
and (28), into (10) gives the secrecy outage probability at high
SNR for Case 2.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we consider a specific scenario that the aver-
age gain ratios for the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination
transmissions are the same, or M1 = M2. Of particular interest
is the outage performance for L → ∞ which shows the best
potential performance for the max-ratio scheme.
First we consider Case 2. Because M1 = M2, the prob-
abilities to select a source-to-relay and relay-to-destination
link are the same, and both equal 1/(K1 + K2). This is
similar to the max-link scheme in [25]. Thus building upon the
analysis in [25], we can obtain that, if L → ∞, the stationary
probability for any state corresponding to K1 = K or K2 = K
must be 0, or we have∑
sl :K1=K2=K
P(sl ) = 1. (29)
This implies that, if L → ∞, at any time, the best link is
always selected from K1 + K2 = 2K available channels with
the max-ratio scheme in Case 2.
In Case 1, unfortunately, we cannot have a simple form
as in (29) for L → ∞, because the probabilities to select
a source-to-relay and relay-to-destination link are not equal,
even with M1 = M2. In order to illustrate the performance for
L → ∞, the original scheme can be assumed to be equivalent
to a virtual relay section scheme having equal probability
to select a source-to-relay and relay-to-destination link, or
P(x < y) = 0.5 where x and y are defined in Section IV-A.
Then in the virtual scheme with L → ∞, the number
of available source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links are
always K ′1 and K ′2, respectively, or
∑
sl :K1=K ′1,K2=K ′2 P(sl ) =
1. If we let K ′1 = K , then K ′2 can be obtained by solving
P(x < y) = 0.5 as (30), as shown at the bottom of the page,
where P(x < y) is given by (35) in the Appendix I.
Since K ′2 obtained from (30) is usually not an integer,
the virtual selection scheme cannot be realized in practice.
However, it provides interesting insight in understanding the
secrecy performance of the original max-ratio scheme in
Case 1 for L → ∞. Normally, we have K ′2 < K , which
implies that, on the average, the best link is always selected
from K ′1 + K ′2 available channels at any time and K ≤
K ′1 + K ′2 ≤ 2K .
For both Case 1 and 2, with a limited buffer size L, we
always have K1 + K2 ≥ K at any time. On the contrary, in the
max-min-ratio selection scheme, the best link is selected from
only K links. Therefore, it follows that the max-ratio scheme
has significantly better secrecy outage performance than the
benchmark max-min-ratio scheme, and the best potential per-
formance for the max-ratio scheme is reached when L → ∞.
This will be verified the next section.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are given to verify the
secrecy outage probabilities for the proposed max-ratio relay
selection scheme. Both Case 1 and 2 are considered. In the
pR→Dsl =
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
K1K2
M1 M2
e
− xM1 e−
y
M2 (1−e− xM1 )K1−1(1−e−
y
M2 )K2−1dxdy =
K1∑
i=0
K2−1∑
j=0
CiK1C
j
K2−1(−1)i+ j
M1 K2
M1+M1 j +M2i . (27)
pR→Dsl =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, K2 = 0, 0 < K1 ≤ K ,∑K1
i=0
∑K2−1
j=0 CiK1C
j
K2−1(−1)i+ j
M1 K2
M1 + M1 j + M2i , 0 < K1 ≤ K , 0 < K2 ≤ K ,
1, K1 = 0, 0 < K2 ≤ K .
(28)
P(x < y) =
K ′1∑
i=1
CiK ′1(−1)
i+1 K ′2(
M1
M2i
)K
′
2B(2, K ′2)F2,1([K ′2 + 1, K ′2], K ′2 + 2, 1 −
M1
M2i
) = 0.5, (30)
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Fig. 2. The secrecy outage probabilities for different relay selection schemes.
(a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probabilities of the max-ratio scheme for
Cases 1 and 2.
simulation, all noise variance and transmission powers are
normalized to unity, and the average channel gains for source-
to-relay and relay-to-destination transmissions are set as γsr =
γrd = 30 dB. Thus the corresponding average channel SNR
is also 30 dB which is high enough to guarantee successful
decoding at the relays and destination. The average eavesdrop-
ping channel gains, i.e. γse and γre, are determined through
the settings of the average gain ratios M1 = γsr/γse and
M2 = γrd/γre, where we let M1 = M2 for various values
in the simulations.
Fig. 4. The secrecy outage probabilities of the max-ratio scheme for different
relay numbers K . (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
In every simulation below, both theoretical and simulated
secrecy outage probabilities are shown to essentially perfectly
match, where the theoretical results are based on (10) and
simulation results are obtained by averaging 5, 000, 000 inde-
pendent runs. This verifies the closed-form secrecy outage
probabilities obtained in this paper.
Fig. 2 compares the secrecy outage performance of the
proposed max-ratio scheme with those for the no relay selec-
tion and the traditional max-min-ratio schemes, where the
relay number is set as K = 5 in all relay selection schemes.
It is clearly shown that the no relay selection scheme has the
worst outage performance and the proposed max-ratio has the
best. It is interesting to observe that, for both Cases 1 and 2,
with buffer size L = 1, the max-ratio still performs signifi-
cantly better than the max-min-ratio scheme. We highlight that
the max-min-ratio scheme is effectively also equipped with a
buffer of size 1, because the relays need to store the decoded
data at one time and transmit out at the next time. However,
even with L = 1, the max-ratio does not reduce to the max-
min-ratio scheme. This is because, for any relay receiving
a data packet in the max-ratio scheme, it has the choice of
whether to transmit the packet out at the next time or not.
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Fig. 5. The secrecy outage probabilities of the max-ratio scheme for different
relay buffer sizes L . (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
On the contrary, the relays in the max-min-ratio schemes do
not have such choices. Therefore, the max-ratio scheme has
“coding gain” over the max-min-ratio approach. On the other
hand, with L → ∞, the best potential performance of the
max-ratio is reached, which is clearly shown in Fig. 2(a) and
(b) for both Case 1 and 2 respectively.
Fig. 3 compares the secrecy outage probabilities of the max-
ratio scheme for Cases 1 and 2, where the buffer size is fixed
at L = 3, the average gain ratios are set as M1 = M2 = 2
or 5, and the relay number is set as K = 2 or 5. It is clearly
shown that the max-ratio scheme in Case 1 has consistently
better performance than that in Case 2.
Fig. 4 compares the secrecy outage probabilities of the
max-ratio scheme for different numbers of relays, where the
buffer size is fixed as L = 5 and the average gain ratios
are set as M1 = M2 = 5. It is clearly shown that, in
both cases, the increase of the relay number can significantly
improve the secrecy outage performance. For example, for the
target secrecy capacity γsc = 0.5, when the relay number
is increased from K = 2 to K = 5, the secrecy outage
probability decreases by approximately 10 dB in Case 1, and
by almost 6 dB in Case 2. This verifies the effectiveness of
Fig. 6. The secrecy outage probabilities vs SNR, where γse = γre =
30 dB and target secrecy capacity is unity. (a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
using the max-ratio relay selection in improving the secrecy
performance.
Fig. 5 compares the secrecy outage probabilities of the
max-ratio scheme for different relay buffer sizes, where the
relay number and average gain ratio are fixed at K = 4
and M1 = M2 = 5, respectively. While both the theoreti-
cal and simulation results have been obtained and perfectly
match each other, only the theoretical results are shown in
Fig. 5 as otherwise it would be too congested for illustration.
Particularly, for L → ∞ in Case 1, K ′1 and K ′2 for the virtual
selection scheme (described in Section VI) are obtained as
K ′1 = K = 4 and K ′2 	 2.23 respectively. The theoretical
result for Case 1 is then obtained by using K ′1 = 4, K ′2 	 2.23
to calculate the outage probability in (10). On the other hand,
the theoretical result for L → ∞ in Case 2 is obtained by
using K1 = K2 = K = 4 in the corresponding outage
probability expression. In both Cases 1 and 2, for L → ∞,
the simulation results are actually obtained by using a very
large buffer size L = 500. It is clearly shown that, for both
Cases 1 and 2, the secrecy outage probability decreases with
the increase of the buffer size L, but the improvement becomes
less significant as L increases. In fact, when L = 50, the
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secrecy outage probability is already very close to that for
L → ∞.
Fig. 6 shows the secrecy outage probabilities vs the SNR
for the proposed max-ratio scheme. It is clear that, in both
Cases 1 and 2, the secrecy outage probability improves
significantly with increased number of the relay nodes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a new max-ratio relay selection policy
for secure buffer-aided cooperative DF networks. With the help
of buffers at the relays, the best relay was selected with the
largest gain ratio among all available source-to-relay and relay-
to-destination links. Both cases with knowledge of exact and
average gain for eavesdropping links were considered, and for
the first time, in the challenging secure transmission context,
closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probabilities
for both cases were derived. Both analysis and simulations
show that the proposed max-ratio relay selection has sig-
nificantly better performance in secrecy outage probability
than the benchmark max-min-ratio scheme, and provides an
attractive way to realize and improve secure transmission at
the physical layer of wireless communications.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF (17)
Noting the definition of x and y in Section IV-A, we have
pR→Dsl = P(x < y) =
∫ ∫
x<y
fXY (x, y)dxdy
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
fXY (x, y)dxdy, (31)
where fXY (x, y) is the joint PDF of x and y.
From the CDF-s of x and y given by (13) and (14)
respectively, the PDF-s of x and y are obtained as
fX (x) =
K1∑
i=0
CiK1(−1)i+1 M1i
(M1+i x)2 and fY (y) =
y K2−1 K2 M2
(M2+y)K2+1 ,
(32)
respectively. Because x and y are mutually independent, we
have
fXY (x, y)= fX (x) fY (y)=
K1∑
i=0
CiK1(−1)i+1 M1 M2 K2iy K2−1
(M1+i x)2(M2+y)K2+1 .
(33)
Substituting (33) into (31) gives
pR→Dsl =
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
K1∑
i=0
CiK1(−1)i+1 M1 M2 K2iy K2−1
(M1 + i x)2(M2 + y)K2+1 dxdy
= 1+
K1∑
i=1
CiK1(−1)i M1 M2 K2
∫ ∞
0
y K2−1
(M1 + iy)(M2 + y)K2+1 dy.
(34)
Then according to [38], if K2 > 1, we obtain
pR→Dsl = 1 +
K1∑
i=1
CiK1(−1)i K2
(
M1
M2i
)K2
B(2, K2)
F2,1
(
[K2 + 1, K2], K2 + 2, 1 − M1M2i
)
; (35)
if K2 = 1 and M1 = M2, we have
pR→Dsl = 1 − K1/2 +
K1∑
i=2
CiK1(−1)i
i [ln(i) − 1] + 1
(i − 1)2 ; (36)
and if K2 = 1 and M1 = M2, we have
pR→Dsl = 1 +
K1∑
i=1
CiK1(−1)i M1
i ln(i)M2 + i ln(M2)M2 − i ln(M1)M2 − i M2 + M1
(M1 − i M2)2 .
(37)
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